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QUESTION PRESENTED
The sole issue presented by this petition is whether
this action warrants exercise of this Court's discretionary
review authority.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action on an insurance policy wherein the
plaintiff, Terri C. Hardy, was awarded judgment against
Beneficial Life Insurance Company for $25,000.00 as a result of
the accidental death of her husband.

The sole issue presented

in the trial court and the Court of Appeals was whether
Mr. Hardy's death from an overdose of drugs was an accident
within the meaning of the insurance policy in question. The
defendant has asserted throughout the proceeding that because
Mr. Hardy had been warned, and apparently understood, that drug
usage would likely shorten his life, his death on the day in
question was a natural and probable consequence of his drug use
and, therefore, not an accident.
The case was submitted on stipulated facts which are
reproduced in the appendix to the petition.

The decision of

the Court of Appeals is reported at 787 P.2d 1.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
EACH APPLIED ESTABLISHED UTAH LAW TO THE
UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THIS CASE AND RULED
APPROPRIATELY
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals noted
that the applicable test for determining whether an event is
accidental is that articulated by this Court in Hoffman v. Life
Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983).

Under

that test, a death is accidental unless it was expected to
follow from the actions of the insured with a high degree of
certainty.

Both courts hold that there was no evidence to

suggest that Mr. Hardy expected to die as a result of his
actions on September 10/ 1981, and that his death was therefore
an accident within the meaning of the policy.

The Court of

Appeals also noted that the vast majority of other
jurisdictions which have dealt with the question have ruled
that absent affirmative evidence of suicide, death from drug
overdose is accidental.

The Court also held that because the

language of the policy is, at best, ambiguous, it must be
interpreted against the company in favor of coverage.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is consistent
with the rulings of this Court, courts of other jurisdictions,
and settled principles of contract interpretation.

This case

presents none of the considerations set forth in Rule 46 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure for granting a Writ of
Certiorari nor is there any other special or important reason

why the matter should be reviewed by this Court.
In this case, the defendant has acknowledged that
there is no direct evidence that Mr. Hardy had any intent to
take his life on September 10, 1981, or any expectation that
his actions on that day would result in his death.

As a

substitute for such evidence, the defendant asserts the courts
below were required to find that Mr. Hardy intended his death
because it was the "natural and probable consequence" of his
conduct and therefore his death "falls under the maxim that
every many must be held to intend the natural and probable
consequence of his deeds."

Brief of Petitioner at p. 9.

As

this Court has noted, however, this maxim is not a substantive
rule of law applicable to disputes arising under insurance
policies.

As this Court stated in Hoffman, supra.,

Although the law frequently employs the
proposition that one intends the natural and
probable results of his conduct in tort and
criminal law, as well as other areas of the
law, a rule based on that proposition is
generally only a rule of evidence giving
rise to an inference, not a conclusive
presumption or a shift in the burden of
proof. The purpose of such a rule in tort
law is to allow an innocently injured
plaintiff to recover against an insane
tortfeasor. However, in accident insurance
law, there are no plaintiffs who have
suffered at the hands of an insane defendant.
When an insurance company has contracted to
cover losses from a certain risk, and the
occurrence of that risk causes an injury
which is insured against, liability under
the policy cannot be avoided on the basis of
a presumption contrary to the actual fact.
669 P.2d at 420 (citation omitted).

In this case, the Court of Appeals noted that the
evidence of Mr. Hardy's history of drug use in the past
actually gave rise to an inference that he would not expect
drug usage to cause death.
Hardy's own extensive experience with drug
abuse raises the inference that he would not
believe, with a high degree of certainty,
that doing only what he had been doing for
some years would cause death on
September 10, 1981.
Hardy v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 787 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1990).
The defendant's assertion that the courts below were
compelled to disregard the evidence and find, instead, that
Mr. Hardy actually intended his death is without support in the
law.
CONCLUSION
This case presents no special or important reason to
warrant exercise of this Court's discretionary power of
review.

There were no disputed facts in the case and the

courts below applied established principles of law in deciding
the legal issue presented.

Accordingly, the petition should be

denied.
DATED this *13*P day of April, 1990.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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